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Introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche

The importance to the humanities and to our culture of the nineteenth-century German philosopher and writer Friedrich Nietzsche may require little motivation or discussion. He was quite simply one of the most influential modern European thinkers. His attempts to unmask the root motives which underlie traditional Western philosophy, morality, and religion have deeply affected subsequent generations of philosophers, theologians, psychologists, poets, novelists and playwrights. Indeed, one contemporary English-speaking philosopher, Richard Rorty, has characterized the entire present age as “post-Nietzschean.” That is because Nietzsche was able to think through the consequences of the triumph of the Enlightenment’s secularism – captured in his observation that “God is dead” – in a way that determined the agenda for many of Europe’s most celebrated intellectuals after his death in 1900. An ardent foe of nationalism, anti-Semitism, and power politics, his name was later invoked by Fascists and Nazis to advance the very things he loathed.

It might also be useful to recall that, according to Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche is the consummation of the Western philosophical tradition, the thinker who brings metaphysics to its end; that Michel Foucault frequently regarded Nietzsche as the progenitor of his own genealogical method and its stress on discursive practices; that Jacques Derrida considers Nietzsche the deconstructive thinker *par excellence*. All this serves as eloquent testimony to Nietzsche’s claim, voiced in *The Antichrist* and elsewhere, that some persons are born posthumously; for that observation certainly applies to his own case. It is no accident, therefore, that the last published edition of the *International Nietzsche Bibliography*, edited by Herbert Reichert

and Karl Schlechta in 1968 – long before the recent explosion of interest in Nietzsche – lists more than 4,500 titles in 27 languages devoted to Nietzsche. And it must not be forgotten that Nietzsche's importance has not been confined to philosophy or even to humanistic study. One much discussed recent critic, Allan Bloom, argued the controversial thesis that America's very cultural life – the mis-education of its citizens as well as its misguided public philosophy – is to be traced to a superficial version of (what the author considered) Nietzsche's virulently infectious nihilism.¹ Indeed, without endorsing Allan Bloom's diagnosis or thesis about Nietzsche's etiological role in the "closing" of the American mind, it is no exaggeration to say that Nietzsche's influence has become unavoidable in our culture. Whether one reads G. Gordon Liddy's misappropriations, goes to a movie, or merely turns on the television, Nietzsche seems always to be already there. For example, Eddie Murphy quotes from Nietzsche at length in a climactic moment in the movie "Coming to America"; a rock music group names itself "The Will to Power"; and even the teen-age "Dr. Howser" of the wretched (and now mercifully canceled) "Doogie Howser, M.D." television show can be heard saying, "As Nietzsche said: 'Whatever doesn't destroy me makes me stronger.'" Could one cite illustrations of Nietzsche's "appropriation" more banal, more crude and pervasive, than these? Nietzsche's name and epigrams are invoked everywhere nowadays, indiscriminately selling ideas as well as products.

From the mid-1890s until today, a century later, Nietzsche's name has been invoked and enlisted repeatedly in the service of every conceivable political and cultural movement and agenda – from early-twentieth-century emancipatory feminism to later fascism and Nazism, from a Faustian modernism to recent versions of post-modernism. Nor is it the case any longer that Nietzsche's pervasive influence is confined primarily to continental European philosophers and politics, intellectuals, and American popular culture. Rather, his critique of traditional morality has become a force in the reflections of some leading Anglophone philosophers, such as Bernard Williams,² Richard Rorty,³ Martha Nussbaum,⁴ Alasdair MacIntyre,⁵ and Philippa Foot.⁶

Given this ubiquity, it is not surprising that Nietzsche commentators disagree about most aspects of his thinking, especially about what an *Übermensch* [superhuman being] is supposed to be, what

eternal recurrence asserts, whether he had developed or had intended to formulate a full-blown theory of the will to power, as well as what his perspectivism may be said to assert. These are disagreements concerning the substance, goal, and success of Nietzsche's attempted transvaluation of all values. On the other hand, there is considerably less disagreement about identifying the deconstructive aspect of his work, the sense in which he sought to disentangle Western metaphysics, Christianity, and morality in order to display what he took to be their reactive decadence. Put crudely and misleadingly, there is considerably less disagreement concerning the negative, deconstructive side of Nietzsche's thinking than there is about the positive, reconstructive side.

These, then, appear to be the two faces of Nietzsche that are recognized by virtually all critics. One face looks at our past and vivisects our common cultural heritage at its roots; the other seems to be turned toward the future, suggesting visions of possible new forms of Western life. The negative, deconstructive, backward-glancing Nietzsche is the face which seems to be more easily recognized by his commentators and his critics. But when one tries to examine in detail Nietzsche's positive, reconstructive face, one is beset by an immediate difficulty. For this other, future-directed face turns out to be not one profile but at least two possible ones. One sketch of Nietzsche's positive profile portrays his remarks about truth, knowledge, superhumanity, eternal recurrence, and will to power as his answers to perennial, textbook philosophical problems: his theory of knowledge, his moral philosophy, and his ontology. On this reading of his reconstructive side, Nietzsche seems to be shattering the foundations of past theories as one demolishes false idols, in order to erect his own, better phoenix from their ashes. In admittedly quite different ways, this seems to be an orientation common to the work of Danto,⁷ Wilcox,⁸ Clark,⁹ and Schacht;¹⁰ or perhaps it is a framework toward which their work points.

The alternative profile of this reconstructive side of Nietzsche rejects the positive/negative dichotomy itself and depicts him instead as attempting to liberate us precisely from the felt need to provide theories of knowledge, or moral theories, or ontologies. Despite admitted differences, enormous ones, this seems to be a useful way of capturing an orientation suggested by the work of Alderman,¹¹ Derida,¹² Nehamas,¹³ Deleuze,¹⁴ Strong,¹⁵ Shapiro,¹⁶ and Rorty,¹⁷ for ex-

ample. The first version of his reconstructive portrait assimilates Nietzsche's project to the great tradition of "the metaphysics of presence" – to the tradition epitomized by Plato, Descartes, and Kant. The alternative portrait sees the negative, deconstructive side of Nietzsche as already *constructive*, in the therapeutic manner of the later Wittgenstein, late Heidegger, Derrida, Rorty, and Foucault.¹⁸

What is at the bottom of these conflicting portraits, perhaps, is an unarticulated difference scarcely recognized among Nietzsche scholars, not to say philosophers generally. It is the difference between those who believe that one is paying him a compliment by reading Nietzsche as "a philosopher" who gives Kantian style answers to textbook questions, and those who view that characterization as depreciating his more broadly "therapeutic" achievement.

A nice illustration of this bifurcated state of affairs is what seems to be occurring in discussions of Nietzsche's perspectivism. What seems to be occurring among Nietzsche scholars is not only a difference of detail – a difference about how to construe Nietzsche's remarks about "knowledge," "truth," "correspondence," and "perspective" – but a metaphilosophical split about the *point* of Nietzsche's perspectivism. For many commentators, Nietzsche's perspectivism is, roughly, his theory of knowledge. It wants to assert four distinguishable claims: (1) no accurate representation of the world as it is in itself is possible; (2) there is nothing to which our theories stand in the required correspondence relation to enable us to say that they are true or false; (3) no method of understanding our world – the sciences, logic, or moral theory – enjoys a privileged epistemic status; (4) human needs always help to "constitute" the world for us. Nietzsche tends to run (1)–(4) together; often he confuses them. But the most serious difficulty for Nietzsche's perspectivism lies elsewhere: the self-reference problem. Are we to understand his many naturalistic and historical theses as accurate representations of the world as it is in itself, as corresponding to any facts of the matter, as privileged perspectives, ones which are conditioned by no need whatsoever? If we are, then Nietzsche's perspectivism is self-contradictory in all four versions mentioned. But that is just to say either that the theories Nietzsche offered are not to be taken perspectivally – in which case his perspectivism must be abandoned – or that they are only perspectives, in which case they may not be true and may be superseded.

To say that they may not be true, however, is just to say that what he maintains may be “false.” But how can he then maintain that there is nothing to which our theories stand in the required correspondence relation to enable us to determine whether they are true or false? Further, in saying that there is no truth did Nietzsche mean to say something true? If he told the truth, then what he said was false, for there had to be a truth to be told for him to say, truly, that there is no truth. If what he said is false, on the other hand, then it is false to assert that there is no truth. But then at least something is true in an unmitigated sense. Similarly, if every great philosophy is really only “the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir” (BGE 6), then what is Nietzsche himself confessing? What is his involuntary and unconscious memoir *really* about? Perhaps the best way to understand his perspectivism, then, is to construe it in a neo-Kantian way, as providing a transcendental standpoint in which putative “facts” about human needs and human neurophysiology play a role not unlike that of Kant’s categories and forms of intuition.

However, there is another, second, and quite different way to construe Nietzsche’s perspectivism remarks: Nietzsche’s “perspectivism” is not a *theory* of anything, and it is most certainly not a *theory* of knowledge. To say that there are only interpretations (or perspectives) is to rename all the old facts “interpretation.” The point of the renaming is to help us set aside the vocabulary of accurate representation which still holds us in its Platonic thrall. Similarly, to say that “truth” is “error” is not to offer a theory of truth so much as it is to rename it. So Nietzsche’s tropes concerning “truth” and “error,” “fact” and “interpretation” are best understood as rhetorical devices to help the reader to understand and confront the widely shared intuition that there must be something like a final truth about reality as such which it is the goal of philosophy to disclose. The reader’s own penchant for the God’s-eye view is surfaced and called into question. Indeed, a theory of knowledge is not something Nietzsche has; the yearning for its possession is what his tropes parody. Knowledge is the sort of thing about which one ought to have a theory primarily when the Platonically inspired God’s-eye view has seduced us, primarily when we construe knowledge on the analogy of vision – the mind’s eye seeing the way things really are – primarily when we see philoso-

phy as culture's referee, allowing or barring moves made elsewhere in culture which claim to be items of knowledge. Yet this is precisely the picture of philosophy and inquiry Nietzsche urges ought to be set aside. Put oversimply, "knowledge" and "truth" are compliments paid to successful discourse, as Rorty and others have suggested. To give an account of such success is always to say why this specific item is "true" or "known" – for example, the superiority of the heliocentric over the geocentric account of planetary motion. There can be explanations and illustrations of successful discourse on a case by case basis, illustrations and explanations of the relative attractions of various competing concrete proposals; but there is no way to slide an unwobbling pivot between "theory" and "reality" which will register an unmediated fit between word and world. There can only be a misconceived "theory of" successful discourse, on this view.

But how are we to choose between such conflicting interpretations of Nietzsche's remarks about perspectivism, not to mention the large array of alternative interpretations not easily captured by this oversimplification?

The case of the "will to power" is equally messy, but for different reasons. These are primarily textual and conceptual. Even if there exists a doctrine, one that can be unpacked "analytically" as a psychological principle, is it to be grasped ontologically, as discarded notes from the *Nachlass* [his literary estate] seem to suggest? How is the will to power to be understood as an assertion of the way things are, rather than as a figure for the self in quest of self, a self in transformation? In the end, the will to power may well reduce to the view that if one must do metaphysics – and perhaps Nietzsche's final recommendation is that this comfort is better given up – then one buys the picture of language as accurate representation, of theory as correspondence to facts; one buys the ultimate and decidable purchase of mapping metaphors along with the correspondence theory of truth. To mitigate the force of that picture, think of Nietzsche's remarks concerning will to power as recommending that we think instead of "things" as events and as families of events. On such a view, the paradox is that a world of only wills, only events, is necessarily formless and formed at the same time. Formless, because wills conceived as events are form-giving while possessed of no fixed or inherent structure of their own, apart from their contextual articulation, apart from what Nietzsche called their "interpretation."

Formed, because wills conceived as families of events are always acting upon one another, are always imposing form upon one another. The paradox is intractable. If we are no longer to think of "wills" as "things," we can form no clear mental image of them. They elude representational thinking. Insofar as we do form a clear mental image, a representation, the formless antecedent eludes us. We invariably picture an entity which has already been formed, structured. We grasp only an "interpretation." Consequently, will to power is the general characterization of this action of will upon will, in which form is imposed by will upon will, that is, by event upon event, in which there is visible only the articulation which we call "the world."

Grasping things as events *simpliciter* is counterintuitive, to be sure, for it requires that we abandon the notion that events consist of items, that they are constituted by the interaction of things. Indeed, prepositional language fails us here, for we are asked to grasp the world as a family of events constituted by and consisting of no-thing in particular, a "world" of relations without *relata*. This difficulty in stating Nietzsche's position is not restricted to his discussion of the will to power. It is a recurring problem in making Nietzsche's argument plain, that in order to state his position or argument one must frequently resort to a vocabulary whose use often depends upon the very contrasts he sought to displace or set aside.

This specific feature of Nietzsche's central themes has been characterized elsewhere as the "self-consuming" character of his concepts, categories, and tropes.¹⁹ A self-consuming concept is one which requires as a condition of its intelligibility (or even its possibility) the very contrast it wishes to set aside or would have us set aside. The notion of will to power as relation(s) without *relata* appears to be self-consuming in the sense specified, as may be the notion of invoking the analogy between seeing and knowing, which Nietzsche's perspectivism explicitly does, in order to set aside the dominating visual metaphors of traditional epistemology. The notions of eternal recurrence and the ideal life may also be usefully viewed – as a preliminary approximation – as self-consuming concepts. The usefulness of viewing some of Nietzsche's most discussed themes as self-consuming is that, so regarded, they resist reification, resist reduction to substantive, traditional philosophical doctrines. Moreover, so regarded, their fluidity is not merely an

accidental feature but a typical feature. Like the literary figure catachresis, Nietzsche's major themes seem necessarily both to solicit and to reject literal interpretation at the same time. The noun phrase "table leg," for example, is a literal expression. There is no other literal expression for which "table leg" is a metaphorical substitute, place-holder, or stand-in. Yet, at the same time, "table leg" is itself a metaphor, since tables can be said to have "legs" only in a metaphorical sense, the sense in which a good glass of cabernet sauvignon may be said to have "legs." The catachresis "table legs" is *both* literal and metaphorical or is *neither* literal nor metaphorical at the same time. And Nietzsche's central themes seem to exemplify a similar paradoxical quality.

Nietzsche's presentation of eternal recurrence is central to his philosophic project. It is the generating thought of his *Zarathustra*, the thought which most divides commentators.²⁰ It is unarguably the subject of two of Zarathustra's speeches – "On the Vision and the Riddle" and "The Convalescent" – and is fully rehearsed in *The Gay Science* under the heading "*Das Grösste Schwergewicht*" [The Greatest Stress]. That entry (#341) concludes by asking its interlocutors two questions framed as one:

If this thought [of eternal recurrence] were to gain possession of you, it would transform you, as you are, or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing, "Do you want this once more and innumerable times more?" would weigh upon your actions as the greatest stress. Or how well disposed would you have to become to life and to yourself to *crave nothing more fervently* [*um nach nichts mehr zu verlangen*] than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?

In Nietzsche's various published writings in which we are invited to think through the notion of eternal recurrence, we are asked the question "How well disposed would one have to become to oneself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than the infinite repetition, without alteration, of each and every moment?" Nietzsche invites his reader to imagine a finite number of possible states of the universe, each destined to recur eternally, and asks his reader's reaction to this imagined state of affairs. Presumably most persons should find such a thought shattering because they would always find it possible to prefer the eternal repetition of their lives in an edited version rather than to crave nothing more fervently than the

recurrence of each of its horrors. Only a superhuman being (an *Übermensch*) could accept recurrence without emendation, evasion, or self-deception, a being whose distance from conventional humanity is greater than the distance between man and beast, Zarathustra tells us in the Prologue to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

But what sort of creature would desire the unaltered repetition of its exact life, would prefer each and every moment of its life just as it is, and would prefer this to any alternative possibility it could imagine? What sort of attitude is suggested by a person, a quester, who could regard his or her life as Leibniz's God regarded the world: the best of all possible worlds?

If the notion of a self-consuming concept is to be of use in understanding Nietzsche's remarks concerning the will to power, eternal recurrence, the ascetic ideal, and the *Übermensch*, then it should also be of use in motivating the sense in which these central themes in Nietzsche generate one version of an old question: Is Nietzsche playing the same philosophical game with different rules or is it now a different game? Is Nietzsche offering new critiques of the tradition, followed by substantive epistemic, moral, and ontological theories on which the critiques depend, or is he suggesting that we cease to speak in this way? Perhaps Nietzsche's critiques just *are* the new game, as they are for Foucault. As in psychotherapy, the negative act of being deprived of something – say, a cherished neurosis – just *is* the gift-giving virtue.

Because of the conflict of interpretations still with us today, this anthology is designed for the use of those reading Nietzsche for the first time as well as those already more familiar with his work. Our opening essay, "Nietzsche's Works and Their Themes," provides an introduction to each of Nietzsche's philosophical writings and an overview of the basic concerns and concepts they are thought to involve. Chronologically organized, this lead essay should be of particular value to those with limited previous experience reading Nietzsche. Those who have done more substantial and sustained reading of Nietzsche might elect to skip this essay – although we do not recommend this – and move directly to the essays which are more concerned with interpretation and analysis.

The first trio of essays which follows our overview concerns Nietzsche's life as well as the appropriation and misappropriation of his writings.

R. J. Hollingdale's "The Hero as Outsider" considers the discrepancy between the facts of Nietzsche's life and the popular, constructed image of Nietzsche as the solitary, suffering, lunatic-genius. Hollingdale argues that Nietzsche has become the object, perhaps the victim, of a legend that has developed a life of its own. Ironically or perhaps deliberately, Nietzsche himself helped create the tradition of legendary freelance philosophers, for he endorsed a view of Schopenhauer as a legendary figure in his *Schopenhauer as Educator*. While Nietzsche was not overly concerned with realism in his portraits of his heroes, it is likely that he would be deeply disturbed by what Hollingdale regards as one of the consequences of his own legend – the fact that many enamored of the Nietzsche legend seldom pay much attention to his books.

Jörg Salaquarda, in "Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian Tradition," offers a religious biography of Nietzsche. Nietzsche was steeped in the Christian tradition, was influenced by it, and was profoundly knowledgeable about it. Indeed, his initial rejection of Christianity grew out of the theological studies that he pursued during his early university years. Educated in the historical mode of Biblical criticism that was popular at the time, Nietzsche became convinced that Christianity's claims to authority and absolute truth were no longer credible. Although Nietzsche did not develop a systematic and fully coherent case against Christianity in any traditional sense, and despite shifts in the extremity of his opposition, Salaquarda contends that Nietzsche's discussions of Christianity reveal more continuities than discontinuities. Even the genealogical method, which Nietzsche employs in *Toward the Genealogy of Morals*²¹ to undercut belief in Christianity and the philosophical, moral, and intellectual habits that he considers linked to it, stem fundamentally from the same historical orientation that originally initiated his loss of faith. Nietzsche's tendency to become more strident in his polemics against Christianity in his later writings stems not from a change of conviction but from his growing disturbance over the inertia of his contemporaries, who seemed unwilling to draw the conclusions that their own intellectual and religious convictions entailed.

In "Nietzsche's Political Misappropriation," Tracy B. Strong sets out to explain the peculiar fact that Nietzsche has been declared an ally by political advocates across the political spectrum: progres-

sive democratic leftists, feminists, socialists, romantics, anarchists, American neoconservatives, social Darwinists, and Nazis. Strong sheds light on this question by reading *The Birth of Tragedy* as a political work that shows how the ancient Greeks constructed a political identity for themselves. The Apollonian and Dionysian principles that Nietzsche viewed as constitutive of Greek tragedy – principles that respectively urge one to take appearances at face value and to recognize that the world has no ultimate foundation – required the Greek to assume an aesthetic stance toward phenomena. By providing a dual perspective toward the self, these principles undercut the possibility of a Greek's finding identity in terms of a single "meaning."

Encouraging his contemporaries to pursue identity as the Greeks did, by interpreting the world mythically and open-endedly, without closure, Nietzsche's own writing resists all attempts to establish a single correct "meaning" of his texts. Political appropriations that profess to have discovered such a meaning in Nietzsche are essentially projections of the readers' own political concerns, Strong argues. Ironically, however, Nietzsche's writings lend themselves to such projections, precisely because he deliberately wrote in a fashion that sought to preclude any definitive, canonical reading.

The second ensemble of essays, a quartet, consider Nietzsche primarily as a philosopher.

Richard Schacht considers some of Nietzsche's specific strategies in "Nietzsche's Kind of Philosophy." Schacht takes issue with certain contemporary deconstructivist readings that regard Nietzsche as rejecting the philosophical enterprise altogether. Nietzsche was committed to philosophy, Schacht argues, albeit philosophy of a nonstandard sort. Primarily concerned with the nature and quality of human life, the problems he thought about concerned morality, religion, psychology, and aesthetics more than the metaphysical and epistemological concerns that are often considered the philosophical "mainstream." Indeed, Nietzsche saw certain mainstream concerns and positions as rooted in dubious presuppositions, and much of his work involves efforts to remove them from the agenda by exposing their questionable foundation.

Denying that any single perspective on reality is "objective," in the sense of being canonically binding for all persons, times, and places, Nietzsche urges a recognition of the perspectival nature of

all knowledge. Nietzsche's perspectivism led him to examine particular "cases" in human experience, the case of the Greeks, for example, and the case of Richard Wagner. Nietzsche's philosophy is also consistently antidogmatic, Schacht points out. He insists on the provisional nature of all of our suppositions, and, accordingly, the kind of philosophy that Nietzsche advocates is open-ended in character, experimentally employing models and metaphors from various domains and eager to draw upon the diversity of human experience.

In "Nietzsche's *Ad Hominem*: Perspectivism, Personality, and *Ressentiment* Revisited," Robert C. Solomon focuses on one of Nietzsche's more striking and peculiar philosophical devices, his employment of the *ad hominem*. Defined as the fallacy of attacking the person instead of the position, the *ad hominem* argument is usually considered inadmissible in philosophical argumentation. Solomon contends, however, that the *ad hominem* is an appropriate expression of Nietzsche's conviction, linked to his perspectivism, that the person and the philosopher are inextricably connected. Insofar as any philosophical outlook is a particular person's interpretation, it makes good philosophical sense to ask what kind of person formulated it, Solomon argues. Nietzsche therefore defends a radically contextualized understanding of what it means to assert a philosophical claim. Nietzsche views philosophy as emerging from one's living engagements. So understood, philosophy should admit *ad hominem* arguments and dispense with the pretension that anyone's arguments are purely "objective" in a sense that divorces theory from theorist.

In "Nietzsche, Modernity, Aestheticism," Alexander Nehamas considers Nietzsche's perspective on modernity. Nehamas rejects the readings of Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, Martin Heidegger, and Alasdair MacIntyre, who characterize Nietzsche as, respectively, a nostalgic romantic, an ironist convinced of reality's blind contingency, the last metaphysician, and a radical relativist. Nehamas regards each of these descriptions as overly simplistic. Nietzsche, he contends, did not believe that we were beyond the need to demand truth or beyond the need to make choices and evaluate some possibilities as superior to others. What Nietzsche has abandoned is the quest for absolute truth, universal values, and complete liberation. For this reason, Nehamas characterizes Nietzsche as a postmodernist. Never-

theless, Nietzsche urges us to attend to goals and truth in local contexts, and to make choices on aesthetic grounds, taking artistic decisions as a model for all choice.

Robert B. Pippin also considers Habermas's interpretation of Nietzsche in "Nietzsche's Alleged Farewell: The Premodern, Modern, and Postmodern Nietzsche." Unlike Nehamas, however, Pippin does not consider Nietzsche a postmodern thinker. Pippin challenges Habermas's characterization of Nietzsche as a counter-Enlightenment thinker. Pippin contends instead that Nietzsche did not place much emphasis on the Enlightenment or modernity as such. What does concern him is the nihilism that he believes has arrived in our era. Indeed, Nietzsche is dissatisfied with the current situation, but he does not prefer the premodern or some postmodern alternative to the modern era. Instead, Nietzsche's self-irony in the presentation of his ideas reflects his recognition that he himself is implicated in modernity, a feature especially evident in his commitment to attending to the tensions inherent in the modern situation.

The final three papers in this anthology consider Nietzsche's influence on the twentieth century. Ernst Behler's "Nietzsche in the Twentieth Century" traces the stages of the European and American reception of Nietzsche over the past hundred years. Among the high points of this chronology are: the early biographies written by Nietzsche's sister and Lou Salomé, the object of his unrequited love; Georg Brandes's presentation of the first public lectures on Nietzsche's philosophy, lectures that presented him as radically aristocratic; the interest in Nietzsche exhibited by George Bernard Shaw and other British socialists; Nietzsche's influence on such literary figures as André Gide, Thomas Mann, Gottfried Benn, and Robert Musil; the influential academic interpretations of Georg Simmel, Karl Jaspers, and Martin Heidegger; Walter Kaufmann's rescue of Nietzsche from National Socialism; and some of the recent German and French interpretations of the "new Nietzsche" that became available after the unreliable editing of Nietzsche's posthumous notes by his fascist sister was exposed and a scholarly edition of his complete works and letters made available.

Alan D. Schrift continues the saga of Nietzsche's influence in France in "Nietzsche's French Legacy." Schrift locates this influence within the context of developments in recent French thought,

and he focuses primarily on the “poststructural” interpretations that were formulated after the waning of the structuralist movement. One tendency among the poststructuralist thinkers is to emphasize “the will to power” in their readings of Nietzsche. They also tend to place considerable emphasis on Nietzsche’s style, contending that the style is an essential part of the content of a philosophical work. Schrift considers the interpretations of Gilles Deleuze, Jean Granier, Bernard Pautrat, and Sarah Kofman as post-structuralist thinkers who place emphasis on Nietzsche’s style and thereby bring under-appreciated thematics to light. Schrift goes on to analyze the work of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Jean-François Lyotard as moving beyond Nietzsche’s work but nonetheless “Nietzschean” in its adherence to a number of Nietzschean themes.

Nietzsche’s influence is not limited to Europe and America. Graham Parkes examines Nietzsche’s Asian reception in “Nietzsche and East Asian Thought: Influences, Impacts, and Resonances.” Parkes begins by indicating the slender extent of Nietzsche’s own knowledge of Asian thought. Similarly, Nietzsche’s initial impact on Japan and China was more enthusiasm based on rumor than detailed scholarly knowledge. However, Nietzsche came to be a significant concern of twentieth-century Japanese thinkers. Besides being a central influence on such literary figures as Mishima Yukio and Akutagawa Ryūnosuke, Nietzsche has had an important impact on the thinking of Watsuji Tetsurō and the philosophers of the Kyoto School (especially Nishitani Keiji).

One omission which will strike some readers is the lack of any discussion of recent feminist readings of Nietzsche. When the contents of this book were originally conceived many years ago, however, feminist discussions of Nietzsche were much more common in the French-speaking world than in the English-speaking world. Moreover, many of the leading French feminist interpretations of Nietzsche are only now being translated and published. Nevertheless, if this anthology were being assembled today for the first time, the topic of feminism would certainly justify more discussion than it, unfortunately, receives here, despite the fact that no single treatment of Nietzsche and feminism, in English, has as yet managed to define the parameters of that debate – as has arguably been done by most of the contributors on the topics covered in this anthology.

NOTES

- 1 This is spelled out in Allan Bloom's popular book (admittedly designed for the general audience), *The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students*, Foreword by Saul Bellow (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), Part 2, esp. pp. 217–26.
- 2 In addition to his celebrated *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, see especially his "Nietzsche's Minimalist Moral Psychology," in *European Journal of Philosophy*, volume 1, number 1 (1993), pp. 1–14.
- 3 See especially his *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
- 4 See especially her essay "Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche's Stoicism," in *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality*, edited by R. Schacht (University of California Press, 1994); but also her discussions of Nietzsche in *The Fragility of Goodness* (Cambridge University Press, 1986) and *Love's Knowledge* (Oxford University Press, 1990).
- 5 See his "Genealogies and Subversions" in his *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1990); also see his earlier discussion of Nietzsche in *After Virtue* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1984, second edition) in which the choice in morality reduces to Aristotle or Nietzsche, as in Chapter 18, "After Virtue: Nietzsche or Aristotle, Trotsky and St. Benedict."
- 6 See her "Nietzsche's Immoralism" in *The New York Review of Books*, 13 June 1991, pp. 18–22, reprinted in Schacht's op cit.
- 7 Arthur C. Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965).
- 8 John T. Wilcox, *Truth and Value in Nietzsche* (University of Michigan Press, 1974).
- 9 Maudemarie Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- 10 Richard Schacht, *Nietzsche* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983).
- 11 Harold Alderman, *Nietzsche's Gift* (Ohio University Press, 1977).
- 12 Jacques Derrida, *Spurs* (University of Chicago Press, 1979) and *Otobiography* (New York: Schocken Books, 1985).
- 13 Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Harvard University Press, 1985).
- 14 Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (Presses Universitaires de France, 1962); translated by Hugh Tomlinson as *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (Columbia University Press, 1983).
- 15 Tracy B. Strong, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration* (University of California Press, 1975).

- 16 Gary Shapiro, *Nietzschean Narratives* (Indiana University Press, 1989) and *Alcyone: Nietzsche on Gifts, Noise, and Women* (State University of New York Press, 1991).
- 17 Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, Solidarity* (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
- 18 Compare this contrast with Steven Taubeneck's "Translator's Afterword" titled "Nietzsche in North America: Walter Kaufmann and After," in *Confrontations: Derrida, Heidegger, Nietzsche*, by Ernst Behler (Stanford University Press, 1991): "Danto, Magnus, and Schacht, each with his own suggestions, offer principles different from Kaufmann's as alternative bases for understanding Nietzsche. Nehamas and Krell highlight to differing extents the roles of Nietzsche's many styles. Bloom, among those who use Nietzsche for other arguments, retains the humanistic-anthropological emphasis and adds a critique of the politics; Rorty downplays the politics and drops the belief in a foundational human nature" (p. 176).
- 19 See especially Chapter 1 of *Nietzsche's Case: Philosophy as/and Literature* by Bernd Magnus, Stanley Stewart, and Jean-Pierre Mileur (New York and London: Routledge, 1993).
- 20 For discussion, see *ibid.*, and "Deconstruction Site: 'The Problem of Style' in Nietzsche's Philosophy," by Bernd Magnus, in *Philosophical Topics* 19, 2 (Fall 1991):215–43.
- 21 In the editors's contributions to this volume, the titles *On the Genealogy of Morals* or *The Genealogy of Morals*, and *Untimely Meditations* will not be used. Instead, the titles now appearing (and/or soon to appear) in the twenty-volume set, *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, edited by Ernst Behler, will be used instead. However, this standardization has *not* been imposed on other contributors to this anthology who have not already adopted such changes themselves (as Behler and Parkes have, for example, in this volume).

The title of Nietzsche's *Zur Genealogie der Moral* has previously been consistently translated in English either as *The Genealogy of Morals* or *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Both translations are misleading, yet their usage continues to this day. Had he wanted to convey the genealogy of morals, the book's title would have been *Die Genealogie der Moral*. At best, therefore, the title of Nietzsche's text might be either *Toward the Genealogy of Morals* or *On the Genealogy of Morals*, but not *The Genealogy of Morals*.

The title is better translated as *Toward* [not *The* or *On*] *the Genealogy of Morals*, in our view, since the contraction "zur" is quite different than the German definite article or the prepositions "von" (on; about) or even "über." And as is very clear from the works of the period (Z and BGE)

whenever Nietzsche wanted to write “on” a topic (in the sense of “about” rather than “toward”) he used the preposition “von,” not the contraction “zur.” In every case in which Nietzsche wrote “on” a subject in *Zarathustra* – for example, from “On the Three Metamorphoses” in Part One to “On Science” in the concluding Part Four – he consistently used the preposition “von.” Most compellingly, however, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, the book immediately preceding GM, the fifth numbered part (entries 186–203) bears the title “zur Naturgeschichte der Moral” [“toward the natural history of morals”]. Nietzsche would most assuredly have written “von der . . .” or “über der . . .” if he had intended to write “on the natural history of morals.” Parenthetically, Walter Kaufmann’s translation of this interesting chapter simply begs the question by refusing to translate the German “zur” altogether. Instead, the header for this fifth part of BGE is translated by Kaufmann as “the natural history of morals.” “Zur” silently disappears, leaving in its wake the mistaken impression that Nietzsche is writing “the” natural history of morals rather than feeling his way “toward” it.

This difference between the prepositions “toward” and “on” in Nietzsche’s GM title is not a niggling difference. It is philosophically significant, because “on the genealogy of morals” suggests an antecedent topic upon which one is remarking; whereas “toward the genealogy of morals” does not imply the prior existence of the subject or method upon which Nietzsche is remarking. The one preposition (“toward”) suggests that Nietzsche is working *in the direction of* the genealogy of morals in a way that the preposition “on” does not suggest.

A similar case concerning a lack of nuance in previously existing translations is corrected by Richard Gray’s nuanced and novel retranslation of the title *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen* as *Unfashionable Observations* [in press] in the complete English language edition of Nietzsche’s published and unpublished writings now in progress, mentioned above, rather than translating it as *Untimely Meditations* or *Unmodern Observations* as had been done hitherto. (Capital letters used above such as Z, BGE, and GM are abbreviations of Nietzsche’s titles, for example, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, *Toward the Genealogy of Morals*. This practice occurs throughout this volume. The reader should be able to infer without difficulty the intended title from the abbreviation.)

